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NOTES
EQUINE SYNDICATIONS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW
An Analysis of the Possible Legal Ramifications
and Problems of Syndication, Including
Possible Securities' Problems
The syndication of animals exploded into celebrity with the now
famous six-million-dollar agreement involving Triple Crown winner
Secretariat. Nevertheless, syndication remains a relatively virgin legal
field with most of the agreements now in effect dating from no earlier
than the 1950's. An abundance of articles, ranging from those appearing in the most popular weeklies to the more sophisticated horseoriented periodicals, have treated the subject of animal syndication;
however, a dearth of information regarding the area exists in legal
scholarship. As far as this writer can ascertain, no endeavor written
from a legal viewpoint has ever entertained the subject with more
than brief aside, and until this date, no case has ever centered wholly
on the law of syndication.
Although this note is not intended to be exhaustive in its scope or
treatment, its purpose is to attempt to provide to the attorney confronted with a syndicate problem general information, guidelines, and
suggestions regarding the syndication of animals and to draw to his
attention possible problem areas one might encounter when drafting
a syndicate agreement or giving advice regarding syndication. Before
looking at a few of the legal questions involved in syndication, however, a synopsis of the history, function, and advantages and disadvantages of syndication is appropriate.
I. Gnowrm Aim DEVEL OP ENT OF HORSE SYNIcATsS
A. Background
The precise date of the first horse syndication is lost in time and
history; however, the impetus for modem syndication springs from
the 1926 syndication of the thoroughbred Sir Galahad III.' Syndicate
ownership of thoroughbreds at that time was far from commonplace,
and the prices, by today's standards, were extremely modest. The
1 Rice, Syndicate Wheeler-Dealers Revolve From Lexington, The Lexington
Leader, Aug. 21, 1964, at 11, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Rice].

EQ NE SYNDICATON

1039

trend to big money investment reached full stride in 1955 when a
2
syndicate purchased the great Nashua with a $1,250,000 sealed bid.
Today, animal syndications range financially from the ethereal heights
of Secretariat to relatively modest investment opportunities.
Interest in the syndication of animals has experienced tremendous
growth since the end of World War II. Prior to that time nearly all of
the more famous thoroughbred stallions were privately owned, whereas since then a high proportion have been the property of syndicates.3
A multiplicity of reasons are relevant to explain this phenomenon.
Probably the greatest single impetus for syndicate ownership has been
cost, 4 not only the spiraling costs of purchasing and maintaining the
animal but also the cost of stud services. Inflationary trends which
have affected other aspects of the world's economy have also affected
the ownership of valuable racing and breeding animals. Closely related to the cost factor has been the concomitant increase in the risks
the individual owner has had to bear. Syndicate ownership provides a
means of lessening the devastating cost-risk ratio of private ownership.
Horsemen are well aware of this aspect of syndication, as is noted
by Morgan Stenley, an official of American Telephone and Telegraph
Company and a syndicate participant:
A fine stallion costs more than one man wants to risk, and the risk is
very great .... So he takes in a number of shareholders to share the
risk, and each one takes one or more shares.5
Beyond this, horsemen who are looking to the future know that
the cost of breeding their animals to a famous stallion may be prohibitive or that the opportunity may be completely unavailable; 6
participation in a syndicate agreement may be the only means of
providing an adequate solution to this problem as well.
Syndications also have become popular as a result of income considerations. As an investment, syndicate ownership offers a potential
for income, though not without an equal amount of risk.
21d.,
3 Of the comparatively few privately owned major sires, Swaps, Bold Ruler,
Native Dancer Bull Lea, Citation and Tim Tam belong to the category. Of the
syndicated stallions, Riva Ridge, Secretariat, Nashua, Carry Back, Bolero, Roman,
Ambioris, and Nasrullah are representative. It has been estimated that 80% of
this country's leading sires are syndicated. Nearly all major stallion importations
from abroad are procured through syndicate purchases. These figures are based on
1959 statistics as quoted in Phelps, Stallion Syndication: An Appraisal, THE
Tionoucumn
REcoiD, Sept. 5, 1959, at 11, Sept. 12, 1959, at 30 [hereinafter
cited as Phelps].
4 Phelps, Sept. 12, at 9.
5 Tower, The Hidden Gamble in Racing, SPouTs ILLusraAaum, Sept. 29, 1958,
at 86 [hereinafter referred to as Tower].

6Id.
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Finally, growing public interest in horse racing and other related
sports has promoted interest in syndication. Accompanying the increasing public appeal have been concurrent increases in the numbers
of tracks, the duration of the racing season, the amount of wagering,
and the value of the purses.7 Syndication has provided both a means
for more people to participate in the horse business and means of
obtaining more horses.
B. Advantages of Syndication
Syndicate ownership offers advantages to horsemen at various
levels. To the owner, it is a mode of alleviating the sting of risk.
Professor Humphries, in Racing Law, has surveyed the benefits of
syndications to the owner:
[Slyndication offers the stallion's owner a chance to sell shares in
his horse while retaining either partial ownership, control or both.
The great loss to be suffered through the death of a valuable animal
can be spread among many, rather than borne by one.8
Equally, the shareholder enjoys certain benefits. To the shareholder
who is a breeder, syndicate ownership provides a kind of triple reward.
First, the breeder has the benefit of being able to make long range
breeding plans; typically, as shall be developed, the syndicate agreement guarantees access to the syndicated horse for breeding purposes.9 Moreover, if the shareholder-breeder should decide not to
take advantage of this aspect, ,"hecan sell or exchange his breeding
season (a season is defined as the individual mating of a stallion to a
broodmare) for a season to another stallion. Or instead he may sell
his shares...."10 Third, syndication offers a practical means by which
a shareholder can retain an interest in several stallions simultaneously
II.

SYNDICATION: CREATIG

A LEcAL ENmY

A. Formulation
As a legalism, a syndicate is a loose term, awaiting the attorneys
professional acumen to give it life, substance and meaning. "Syndicate," although widely used and referred to, does not apply to any
particular legal or business form. On the contrary, any business
association can appropriately be entitled a syndicate."1 One writer
Humrmums, RACING LAW 23 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Htmn' urEs].
8 Id.at 23.
9 Tower, supra note 5, at 38.
10 Id.
11J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNEBSHIP 138 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as CRANE & BRoEmGIc].
7J.
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has defined syndication as the "pooling of the resources of a group of
individual investors to acquire and develop an asset."12 Like most
other business associations, the purpose of the syndicate is ultimately
profit, either in the form of finances or in the form of guaranteed
breeding rights. Depending on the subject matter of the agreement,
the syndicate, as an entity, may consist of a handful of generally
wealthy investors, well-known to one another and each personally
participating in the operation of an enterprise, or it may be a widely
held venture whose numerous participants are dependent upon the
integrity, judgment and ability of the syndicate manager for their investment award. Syndicate ownership of horses is a hybrid of both
these forms-usually consisting of 30-40 participants who may or may
not know one another, while using a syndicate manager or a facsimile
thereof to handle the enterprise.13 The reasons for this particular
developmental form in horse syndications are twofold: (1) as earlier
indicated, the relatively small number of investors bears a close
relation to the breeding abilities of the stallion; and (2) the management arrangement is dictated by the nature of the syndicate's property
and the tradition of the thoroughbred industry.
Broadly speaking, horse syndications are of two types: the closed
syndicate, in which all the seasons are reserved for syndicate shareholders or those to whom they have sold, traded, or otherwise released
the season; and the open syndicate, in which there are some seasons
open for sale to non-shareholders. 14 Sale of open seasons to nonshareholders is frequently left to the discretion and expert judgment of the
syndicate manager. Occasionally, even in a closed syndicate, seasons
may become available due to the death or illness of a shareholder's
mare, the death of a shareholder, retirement from the syndicate by a
member, or even a shareholder's decision not to breed during a
particular season.
In creating a syndicate, three elements are essential to propel the
enterprise from idea to reality. These are a good horse, a number of
persons willing to invest money in it and accept the concomitant risks,
and a promoter or syndicator who can quickly and efficiently bring
these elements together. 15 Ordinarily, prior to the syndicate's formation, the promoter will have selected the horse that the venture will
own; however, on occasion syndicates have been formed with the
express purpose of increasing their purchase power at sales through
12fBerger, Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promoters and the Need for Protection, 69 YALE L.J. 725, 726-27 (1960) thereinafter cited as Berger].
13 Phelps, Sept. 5, at 11; Sept. 12, at 11.
14 Phelps, Sept. 12, at 12.
15
Tower, supra note 5, at 37.
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the pooling of funds.16 Remuneration for the promoter-syndicator's
efforts may be in the form of a cash outlay, through shares and the
rights attached thereto in the enterprise, or, if an attorney is acting
as the promoter, through legal fees and a retainership for the duration
of the enterprise. 17
Syndication agreements can involve differing aspects of the horse's
career. Typically the syndication occurs after the horse has shown
some extraordinary promise; however, syndicate purchases of untried
yearlings are not unknown. s Some syndications involve only the
racing career of the horse with the shareholders or syndicate participating proportionately in the expense and winnings of the horse during
its racing career; when the horse is retired from racing, the racing
syndicate ends. Others (and the most frequent type), while created
during the racing career of the horse, have syndicate ownership taking
effect only when the horse is retired from racing in sound condition,
and still others combine both racing and breeding aspects.' 9 No legal
bar exists to a syndication occurring at any point in the horse's career.
B. ContracturalAspects
Syndication agreements are essentially contractual in nature and
are, therefore, governed by general contract principles. Consequently,
the doctrine of freedom of contract is applicable, and the terms, duties,
and conditions vary with the goals and purposes of the enterprise
and the drafter's skills; however, certain characteristics appear in nearly
all such agreements involving animals. For instance, if the syndicate
is aimed primarily at the horse's breeding career, the number of shares
sold is equivalent to "the maximum number of mares [normally 32]
the stallion will presumably be able to service in a year."20 Consequently, as previously noted, horsemen interested in obtaining the
stallion's services are, therefore, attracted as potential investors since
owning a share in the enterprise may be his only assurance of getting
such service.
Frequently, the original owner of the horse Will establish the syndication plan or, at a minimum, will be a controlling element in determining the terms of the contractual agreement and will retain one
or more shares in the animal himself.2 1 This owner-drawn form of
syndication pact has certain distinct advantages for the owner-syn16 Phelps, Sept. 5, at 30.
17Berger, supra note 12, at 734-35.
18 Phelps, Sept. 12, at 12.
19lRice,
supra note 1.
20
HuMxmus, supra note 7, at 23.
21 Id.
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dicator. For example, while selling shares permits the owner to spread
the risk of loss and to minimize his expenses, it allows him to retain
either partial ownership, control, or both, over the horse, thereby
providing a means of retaining the pride of ownership which is so
much a part of this unique industry. As a consequence of this recurrent
owner-syndicator planning, it is not extraordinary for the syndication
agreement, especially if the syndicate involves a horse still participating
in racing, to contain a proviso vesting control over the management
of the horse in the original owner as syndicate manager or in a committee or board on which the original owner is a member.22 Often the
selection of the syndicate manager has been predetermined as an included term of the contractual agreement; therefore, designation of a
particular syndicate manager or appointment to the syndicate committee may be concluded before the share is even marketed. Regardless
of the method of selection, the syndicate manager or committee is
responsible for nearly every aspect of the horse's life as well as for
handling the business aspects of the enterprise, such as providing
accounting statements, setting extra-syndicate service fees, and generally guarding the welfare of the enterprise. 2 3 Additionally, the agreement permitting, the syndicate manager may be a significant party in
arranging for resales of shares or sale of open seasons. Furthermore,
this method provides an explanation of the phenomenon of a syndicated animal retaining the colors of the original owner and of its
remaining in the possession of the original owner.
Virtually all syndication agreements, whether for racing or breeding, provide for a system by which all shareholders share in proportion to their interests the expenses and profits of the syndicate's
business. 24 Commonly, assessments are made on a per share basis to
provide for the animars maintenance and expenses. Similarly syndicate income is ordinarily charged against the expenses of the enterprise, and any net profits are distributed on a per share basis. Where
several open seasons are available, profits could be sizable. Likewise,
where the private shareholder is able to market his unused seasons,
returns could be quick and appreciable.
To prevent the overbreeding of a horse and a subsequent flood of
the thoroughbred market or damage to the horse, a frequent stipulation
in the agreement limits the number of mares to be covered annually.
Some agreements state a maximum number of mares, conditions permitting, which the stallion will service, whereas other agreements grant
22 Id.

23 Phelps, Sept. 12, at 11.
Hu
BEmws,
supra note 7, at 24.

24
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authority to the syndicate manager, syndicate committee or some
other appropriate party, such as a syndicate-committee-approved
veterinarian, to determine the proper number.2 5 While a shareholder,
by virtue of his ownership, is given preferential access to the stallion,
such access is not necessarily absolute. Frequently, approval by the
syndicate manager or other party is a condition precedent to obtaining
service whether the shareholder is attempting to bring his own mare
or has sold his season's breeding right to a non-shareholder horseman 2
Finally, many syndication agreements provide for syndicate ownership to take effect only upon a specified event or upon certain conditions precedent, such as presentment of a sound and fertile horse.
Until all conditions precedent are fulfilled, ownership, possession and
control of the animal remain with the owner; the syndicate shareholders
are merely contingent owners. If for any reason a condition precedent
is not satisfied, the syndicate shareholder is released from his obligations and is refunded his cash outlay.2 However, as shall be developed
more fully, once syndicate ownership takes effect the investors bear all
28
the risk of loss of invested capital.
Since a syndicate is not per se a business association or form
recognized by the law, any of a variety of entities with concomitant
rights and obligations may designate itself a syndicate. Unlike corporation law, partnership law or limited partnership law, no distinct
statutory body of "syndicate law" exists; therefore, the members of the
syndicate by their association may be a limited partnership, a general
partnership, a joint venture or even a corporation. 29 Contractual terms
of the syndicate agreement and tax considerations generally dictate
the operational form which the syndicate will assume.30
C. Valuation and Sale
One of the initial problems facing a party who is attempting to put
together a syndication package is obtaining an accurate and fair
valuation of the horse to be syndicated from which the price of shares
can be determined. While professional horsemen sometimes allude to
an "appraisal" value based upon the history, performance and antici25 Id.
2

6 Interview with Arnold Kirkpatrick, President of THE THOROUGHBRED RFCoRD, in Lexington, Ky., Oct. 29, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Kirkpatrick Interview].
27
See generally 3 A. CoRBIN, COBnIN ON CoNraACrs §§ 627-28 (1951).
28
Berger, supra note 12, at 729.
29
Greenwood, Syndication of Undeveloped Real Estate and Securities Law
Implications, 9 Hous. L. REv. 53, 56-60 (1971).
s See generally Casey, How to Determine Best Form For Real Estate Syndicate to Preserve Tax Advantages, 7 J.TAx. 328-30 (1957); Rabinowitz, Realty
Syndication: An Income Tax Primer for Investor and Promoter, 29 J.TAx. 92
(1968).
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pated potential of the animal plus their own "horse sense", more often,
especially in breeder syndications, a formula based on the estimated
cost of stud fees is utilized. The formula works as follows: after
estimating what the service fee per stand (a term of art designating
the stud fee per broodmare serviced) will be, the syndicator multiplies
this figure by three and assigns it as the price per shareY1 For example,
if a stallion is estimated to be worth $50,000 for each mare it services
(i.e. per stud fee), the cost of the syndicate share would be $150,000.
This method is not as mystical as it appears at first glance. The
figure three is chosen as the multiplier because it is felt this is the
maximum risk period beyond which the prospective purchaser will not
venture. After three breeding seasons, the equine's first foals are
running, and at that point the shareholder is likely to realize the
value of the stallion as a sire and the future of his investment. If the
stallion's foals are winners, the syndicate shareholder probably has
made a profitable investment. Conversely, if the stallion's foals are
defective or are not good runners, the shareholder has probably lost
all or a significant portion of his investment, except that portion he has
been able to recapture through the sales of open or extra seasons.
Unlike the corporate shareholder who can wait for an upturn in
business after a losing period, the shareholder in a horse syndicate
usually suffers irretrievable losses if the stallion's foals prove unsatis32
factory.
Once a value has been determined, sale of shares in an equine
syndication varies with the terms of agreement. After the price is
established by the syndicator-promoter, he then offers the shares,
usually through individual contact, to parties whom he thinks might
be interested in such an investment. Syndicate shares are not offered
to the general public through the open market; nor, customarily, are
they advertised.33 Normally the sale of syndicate shares involves a
kind of limited solicitation. Typically a prospective purchaser is given
a specific time period in which to make his purchase; failure to
exercise his purchase right frees the syndicator to make an additional
offer elsewhere. Depending on the terms of the syndicate agreement,
fractional parts of shares may be purchased;3 4 however, full shares
usually have the exclusive right to vote. When fractional interests are
sold, the fractional shareholders must agree among themselves as to
how the rights of share ownership are to be divided.
31 Kirkpatrick Interview, supra note 26.

Robertson, Put the Cards on the Table, THE TsonounnHnal RECORD, Nov.
28, 1970,
3 3 at 1898 [hereinafter cited as Robertson].
Kirkpatrick Interview, supra note 26.
34 Phelps, Sept. 5, at 11.
S2
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HI. SYmNcDI__ AS PAYTNERSHIPS

Although many syndicate shareholders may consider themselves
merely "members of a syndicate" and believe they are involved in no
other legal relationship, the association, unless otherwise designated
by the terms of the syndicate agreement (and registered accordingly
if required by law), should be regarded as a general partnership for
legal purposes and subject to the Uniform Partnership Act. Professor
Humphries early noted that the question of legal identification of the
syndicate relationship could be a source of problems. His concern ran
to balancing the need for freedom in the syndicate manager's exercise
of his expertise against the need to protect the shareholder's rights:
If the stallion manager's decisions are scrutinized from the corporate law aspect, they may be unduly restricted. Yet if treated under
partnership law the syndicate may be unable to sell, or forced into
dissolution.85

The reasons why the syndicate relation should be treated as a general partnership in the eyes of the law, unless it designates itself otherwise, are multitudinous. One of the main reasons involves taxes.
Most syndicate shareholders attempt to obtain the preferential taxation
of a partnership on any profits earned by the syndicate, thereby avoiding the double taxation of a corporation.3 6 That the syndicate shareholder sees himself as a partner for tax purposes supports the hypothesis that a syndicate is a form of partnership and should be governed by
partnership law.
The provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act [hereinafter UPA]
(which Kentucky adopted in 1954) also lend themselves to viewing
the syndicate as a partnership relation. For instance, a partnership,
defined in terms sufficiently broad to encompass syndicate ownership,
is "an association of two (2) or more persons to carry on as co-owners
of a business for profit."37 Embodied in this statutory definition is a
four-pronged test for determining whether or not an association is a
general partnership: first, the association must have in excess of one
3

5HMPHRIES, supra-note 7, at 24.

36 B. BrrrxER & J. EusrxcE, FEDEiAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATiONS
Note that

AND SHAnoLDERs § 2.05 (3d ed. 1971).

[a] syndicate, pool, joint venture, or other incorporated group which carries on a business, financial operation, or venture is under Regs. §
301.7701-3(a), taxable as a partnership unless it constitutes a trust, estate,
or association.

Id. at 2-12 (footnote omitted): See INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, § 761(a) for a
statutory endorsement of this definition. For litigated cases regarding syndicates
and other similar organizations, see Bloomfield Ranch v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d
586 (9th Cir. 1948); Junior Miss Co., 14 T.C. 1 (1950).
87 Ky.REV. STAT. § 362.175(1) (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS]; UmTFom
PARNEasmm AcT § 6(1) [hereinarter cited as UPA].
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member; second, and implied, the association must be voluntary; third,
the association must have profit as its motivating force; and fourth,
the members of the association must be co-owners. Each of these
characteristics find easy applicability to the horse syndicate.
Horse syndicates, particularly breeding syndicates, ordinarily have
in excess of thirty members; therefore, it easily exceeds the "two or
more members" requirement. Moreover, although partnerships are
usually not thought of as having thirty or more members outside of
professional associations, the statute may clearly be construed to admit
such a number without violence to the statutory language. Additionally, a few commentators have recently attempted to dispel the
judicial and popular misconception that a general partnership as a
business organization is not adaptable to financial ventures "by large
individuals seeking merely an investment opgroups of unrelated
38
portunity.
Another trait of partnerships which is equally characteristic of the
horse syndicate is the voluntariness of the association.' Like a partnership, a syndicate is the result of a voluntary act whereby the syndicate
investors contractually agree to associate themselves for the purpose of
carrying on a business. Since it is frequently stated that the partnership status depends upon whether the parties intend to form a partnership, it could be said, at least arguendo, that a syndicate is not a
partnership because the contracting parties lack the requisite intent.
This thesis, however, becomes enfeebled under the critical dissection
of the objective rather than subjective standard which the courts and
commentators have long urged and applied. It is the substance of the
relationship-not its label-which is decisive:
[T]he question is not what the parties have called their relation, but
whether by their agreements and actions they show an intent to
create the legal relationship which the law recognizes as constituting a partnership.3 9
Under this objective standard, whether the syndicate members subjectively intended to become partners is of little significance. If all
of the legal ingredients for a partnership obtain in the business association, it will be deemed a general partnership for legal purposes.
The presence or absence of co-ownership is, perhaps, the most vital
factor in determining whether a particular association is a partner38
Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Interests as
37 Mo. L. REv. 581, 587 (1972).
Securities,
s 9 Ham, Kentucky Adopts the Uniform Partnership Act, 43 Ky. L.J. 5, 9
(1955). The courts in Kentucky have long used an objective test for determining
the presence of a partnership. See Crawford v. Wiedemann, 166 S.W. 595, 597
(Ky. 1914).
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ship.40 Co-ownership or joint ownership as it applies to determining
partnership status turns on the power of ultimate control over the enterprise. While the ability to exercise the degree of control normally
associated with co-ownership may be sharply curtailed under the contractual terms of the syndicate agreement (a practice provided for in
the UPA41 and a practice which could create problems regarding
securities regulation), a sense of co-ownership is at the heart of the
horse syndicate. Perhaps the best evidence of this is the scheme
typically provided by the syndicate agreement whereby profits and
losses are shared on a pro rata basis by the shareholders. Although the
UPA emphasizes the concept of co-ownership and control, the presence
of profit sharing provides a strong implication that the association is
a partnership. Profit sharing as a characteristic of a partnership should
not be underestimated because "[i]n the eyes of the law, profit sharing
is undoubtedly the most important single factor indicating that the
parties intend to carry on the business as partners."42 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals, while recognizing that the sharing of profits is not
an exclusive test for a partnership, has stated that it is "an important
consideration as an item of evidence tending to prove" the existence
of such a relationship. 43 Furthermore, the UPA provides that the "receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie
evidence that he is a partner."44
The control factor as related to the requisite co-ownership element
must be placed in proper perspective in discussing horse syndications
as partnerships. The amount of control exercisable by a shareholder
in a horse syndication is dictated by the syndicate agreement. As
shall be developed more fully, much of the shareholder's ultimate
control over the project is relinquished through his acceptance of the
terms of the syndicate agreement. V/hile this lack of control may
cause problems in other areas of the law, this should not prevent the
syndicate from falling within the definition of a general partnership.
On the contrary, such a pratice is clearly permitted by Section 362.235
of the Kentucky Revised Statutes which, echoing section 18 of the
UPA, provides that "[t]he rights and duties of the partners in relation
to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement
between them...
40

-45

CRANE & BRoMBEnG, supra note 14, § 14.
See also KRS § 362.235.

42 Id.
41

43

Ham, supra note 39, at 10.
Boreing v. Wilson, 108 S.W. 914, 922 (Ky. 1908). See also KIBS § 362.180

(3)-(4).

44 UPA § 7 (4). KRS § 362.180 (3)-(4).
45 KRS § 362.235.
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The final common characteristic of both the partnership and the
syndicate is the profit motive. Profit, in the sense of monetary enrichment through financial return or through breeding rights, pervades the
horse syndication and needs little discussion.
The horse syndication thus contains all of the requisite elements
of a general partnership and should be treated as such for legal
purposes. It is a hybrid form of partnership, put together by a tightly
drawn agreement in which much of the traditional partnership control
is forfeited. Nevertheless, the attorney, in advising his client about
the extent of his liability through his membership in a syndicate,
should be cognizant that, ultimately, partnership law will be applicable
to this business association.

IV.

DISADVANTAGES OF SYNDICATE OWNS HIP

While the attractiveness and flexibility of the syndicate form of
ownership has its stated advantages, the attorney should be aware,
both as drafter and counselor, of the risks and disadvantages peculiar
to such an association. Many knowledgeable horsemen feel syndication has been a major influence in causing the soaring costs in the
horse industry.40 Additionally, in the thoroughbred industry, if the
horse is syndicated before retirement from racing, there is no assurance,
absent a syndicate provision, that the horse is fertile. However, even
if he is fertile when syndicated, fertility does not guarantee that his
offspring will be of value as a racing animal. Moreover, for the shareholder who joins for breeding rights only, at least a twenty percent
chance exists that he will have a barren mare each breeding season.4 7
In addition, many horsemen feel syndication, with its contemporaneous
effect on advertising and interest, may reduce the value and worth of
a less renowed horse which might have good breeding potential.48
Aside from these relatively unimportant risks from a legal standpoint,
there are two major problem areas-liquidity and lack of investor control-with which the attorney must be familiar.
A. Liquidity
Liquidity, a well-known problem in syndicate ownership, 49 surfaces
when a syndicate shareholder wishes to sell his interest prematurely.
40 Phelps, Sept. 12. at 9.
Tower, supranote 5, at 88.
48 Phelps, Sept. 12, at 9, 11.
49 See generally Problems in Selling Syndicate Shares, THE BLooD-HoRsE
WExI=Y, Nov. 21, 1970 at 4147-49 (Panel Discussion, Thoroughbred Club of America Meeting Keeneland Race Course, Lexington, K ., Nov. 12, 1970) [hereinafter
cited as Problems in Selling Stallion Shares]. See also Robertson, Put the Cards on
the Table, THE TkonouGHanm BEcosm, Nov. 28, 1970, at 1898.
47
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The primary reason for the non-liquidity of syndicate shares is that
there is no formal secondary market where the withdrawing member
can sell; therefore, the syndicate investor who wants to dispose of
his interest has to rely on his own resources to find an interested buyer.
Occasionally, the syndicate manager or committee will assist in selling
the share, a method preferred by many horsemen,50 or the shareholder,
unless prohibited by the syndication agreement, may put the share
up at public auction.
A second factor affecting the liquidity of the syndicate share involves restrictions upon free alienability which may be imposed on
the syndicate shareholder. Restraints on alienability are aimed at
protecting the interests of the remaining shareholders, the personal
relations of the syndicators and shareholders, and the pride of those
shareholders who are still committed to the horse.51 While the nature
of the restraint varies with the specific terms of the syndicate agreement, the restrictive provisions often require that: (1) the transferee
must be a member of a recognized or designated class; (2) the transferee must be approved by the syndicate manager, after notification is
given of the intent to sell, the selling price, and the terms and conditions of the sale; or more frequently (3) the nonselling members
reserve the right of first refusal.52 Likewise, it is not uncommon for
the agreement to prohibit the public auction of a share because of the
unsatisfactory, unpredictable and often unrealistic bids that may result
from the use of that sales method:
Many of the bids offered at auction were so low as to be unrealistic,

and some were downright insulting. While the syndicates could,
and usually did, exercise their options of refusing such bids and
retaining the shares, publication of the prices offered was an embarrassment to remaining syndicate members, to say nothing of the
effect on outsiders who had bred to the stallion for a cash stud fee
which often as not was higher than the auction "price" of a syn-

dicate share."
Similarly, some horsemen have even expressed dissatisfaction with
54
sealed bid auctions.
Problems in liquidity have a dual effect. Not only are they disconcerting to the seller, but also they may have an adverse effect upon
the remaining syndicate members. Unless the syndicate decides to
50 Robertson, supra note 32, at 1898.
51 Problems in Selling Stallion Shares, supra note 49.
52 HM jmmus, supranote 7, at 24.
53 Robertson, supra note 32, at 1898. See generally Problems in Selling
Stallion Syndicate Shares, supra note 49.
54 Kirkpatrick, supra note 26.
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retain the share, a low selling price can adversely affect the value of
all the shares. Concurrently, a low public sale price can raise the
spectre of suspicion-with a resultant loss of business -in those who
might have been considering a cash stud fee. inevitably the dangers
are accentuated in proportion to the number of shares offered for sale.
Massive sales are indicative of massive problems. Methods of-avoiding
some of the problems related to public sales have been suggested,
including the elimination of post auction options of first refusal and a
clearing house for stallion shares;5 5 however, little prdgress has been
made to this date.
Liquidity involves considerations beyond the salability of the share.
For credit purposes, the collateral value of an unincorporated syndicate
share, the ordinary form of equine syndicates, is limited, with the loan
to value ratio being disproportionately low56 While this should not
usually be a factor with a person contemplating investment in an
equine syndication, it makes the purchase of a syndicate share for a
short term investment unwarranted.
B. Lack of Control
A second major drawback in the mechanics of syndicate operation
concerns the lack of investor control. Repercussions from this characteristic of most equine syndications affect not only the unwary investor but also the attorney who might be involved in the actual syndication process. As shall be developed more fully, the lack of investor
control is a prime consideration in the determination of whether the
syndication of an animal involves a security and, therefore, requires
the appropriate registration.
The degree of investor control, at least in part, derives from the
legal form imposed upon or designated by the syndicate entity. For
57
instance, assuming that a syndicate is treated as a general partnership,
the general partners, subject to the terms of the agreement, may
examine the syndicate's books, 58 require full and true information on all
matters affecting the syndicate,5 9 obtain a full and formal account of
syndicate affairs, 60 and share equally in the management and control
of the enterprise."1 Additionally, one partner (i.e. shareholder) may
55 See generally Berger, supra note 12.

50
Robertson, supra note 32, at 1901.
57
It is assumed the law applicable to partnershi S would also abply t joint
ventures. For the rights of limited partners, see KRS §362.500.
t
58 KRS § 362.240.
59KRS § 362.245.
GOKRS § 362.255.
61KBS § 362.235(5).
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hold all other partners accountable as fiduciaries.62 Although all of
these rights are statutorily granted, they are subject to the terms of
the syndication agreement; therefore, many of them in reality may be
illusory, having been forfeited by the investor as a condition precedent
to his owning a syndicate share. Investor control, because of the
nature of the enterprise, is usually severely limited, with the ultimate
decision making or managerial functions regarding the horse being
delegated to the syndicate manager or committee who act as agent
for the investor. Typically, as Professor Berger has noted: "In this
capacity [syndicate manager], the promoter needs consent only for
stated major decisions." 63 In some instances, as-will be seen, even major
decisions may be within the scope of the decision-making power of
the syndicate's management.
The range of decisions which the syndicate manager or committee
may make regarding the syndicate's horse is virtually unfettered in
many of the syndicate agreements. Many horsemen believe "the
manager should be empowered to decide what's best for the horse,
and thereby for the syndicate as a whole."6 4 Some horsemen have
even encouraged the adoption of a uniform syndicate agreement,
provided one could-be drawn which granted the manager the necessary free hand he requires in managing the affairs of the enterprise. 65
Decisions by the syndicate manager 6 or committee may extend from
important areas requiring great expertise, such as the suitability of the
horse for racing or breeding, the time to terminate the horse's racing
career, and the establishment and collection of stud fees, to areas
more mundane or business oriented, such as the selection of the colors
the horse is to bear, the determination of a proper veterinarian to
administer to the horse's medical needs, advertising regarding the
horse, and even the location where the horse is to stand subsequent
7
to his racing career.6
While the shareholders arguably retain the ultimate decisionmaking power through their voting rights on major decisions, many
important decisions which are largely determinative of the success or
failure of the enterprise are entrusted to the syndicate manager.
The unhappy investor may find that changes .in the managerial
62

KRS § 362.250.

634 Berger, supra note 12, at 744.

0 Robertson, supra note 32, at 1901.
Id.
GO
Htmsmus, supra note 6, at 23-24.
67 If the syndicate manager is a syndicate member (as he often is) and the
agreement vests in him virtualy all control, he will probably be regarded as being
in a fiduciary capacity to the other shareholders. See KRS § 362.250.
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attitudes are difficult, if .not virtually impossible, to effect. Not
atypically, the position of syndicate manager (as well as membership
on the syndicate committee) is for life. Changes may be brought
about only by death or by a stipulated vote of the shareholders, such
as a majority or two-thirds of the voting shares. Couple the duration
of the appointments, the voting requirements and the lack of a
market for a share, and it becomes apparent that the disenchanted
investor, because of his lack of control, may be without a suitable
remedy.
V. SYxmicATE SHARES: SEcumrrEs oR NoT?
Lurking beneath virtually every aspect of horse syndications thus
far discussed in this note and closely related to some of the earmarks
of such enterprises is the intricate and troublesome question of whether
selling shares in a horse syndication involves the sale of a security
under the Securities Act of 1933. Concurrently, the related question
follows: if such a transaction does involve the sale of a security, must
it be registered with the appropriate federal and/or state agencies?
The significance of this inquiry is seen in the rather severe civil
penalty for failure to register a security with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The statute provides that one who offers or sells
a security in violation of the registration requirements is liable to the
purchaser for either "the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
the tender of such security, or for damages if [the purchaser] no
longer owns the security." 68
The growing inclination of both the Securities and Exchange Commission and the nation's courts to expand the concept of a security,
coupled with the tendency of the courts to provide buyers a wider
choice of statutory remedies, has substantially magnified the impact
of securities law on the business community.6 9 While no horse syndication accomplished in Kentucky (or in other states as for as can be
determined) has ever been registered as a security with either the
appropriate state or federal agencies and while the question has not
yet been raised in litigation, the knowledgeable attorney, as advisor
or drafter of a syndication agreement, should be cognizant that this is
potentially a highly flammable area and that, as noted previously, a
0s9 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
6 Pasquesi, The Expanding 'Secuities"

Concept, 49 ILL. B.J. 728 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Fasquesil. See also Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287

F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643 (S.D.N.Y 1968)
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failure to comply with registration requirements, should it be concluded
that a security is involved, has rather severe results.7 0
Since state securities regulations vary greatly71 and since the
satisfaction of federal registration requirements can be coordinated to
satisfy Kentucky's registration requirements, 72 the major focus of the
possible security aspects of horse syndication will be in regard to the
federal securities regulation. Federal regulation of newly issued securities received its major impetus from the enactment of the Securities
Act of 193373 [hereinafter Act]. Centered around a philosophy of full
disclosure, 74 the Act's main goal is to protect the public before invest70

On the federal level, violations of the Securities Act of 1938 expose the
issuer to both civil and criminal sanctions:
Civil: The Securities Act of 1933 creates a cause of action in the security
purchaser for recovery of the consideration paid less income, or for damages,
against any person offering or selling securities in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1970), or by means of a misleading prospectus or oral communication if the mails
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce are used.
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
Criminal: The Act makes unlawful the use of "any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails" for the
offering or sale of securities unless the registration statement, when required is in
effect for such security. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). Moreover, the Act forbids any
person from misrepresenting that an SEC registration is equivalent to SEC
approval. 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1970). The maximum penalties for a criminal
violation of the Act are $5,000 fine or 5 years imprisonment, or both. 15 U.S.C. §
77x (1970).
-'On the state level, Kentucky's Blue Sky Laws offer similar civil and criminal
penalties.
Civil: KRS § 292.480 provides that any person who offers or sells or who
"directly or indirectly controls or "materially aids" in the offer or sale of an unregistered, but not exempt, security or who sells a registered security by means of
an untrue statement of a material tact or by omitting a material fact is
liable to the person buying the security from him, who may sue either
at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
payment, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender of the security, or for
damages if he no longer owns the security.
Criminal: KRS § 292.991 provides that any person who wilfully violates any
provision of Chapter 292 (Securities), except KRS § 292.440 (regarding misleading statements), shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) or
imprisoned
not more than three (3) years, or both.
71
Surprisingly, only Delaware, king of corporation legislation, has no securities
act.
72 KRS § 292.360.
73 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1970).
74 See the President's Message, March 29, 1933, contained in H.R. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) wherein the President stated:
of course, the Federal Covernment cannot and should not take any
action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that
newly issued securities are sound in the sense that the value will be
maintained or that properties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue
of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied
ful pbliityand information, and that no essentially imp ortant
'bb
eJement attendin~g the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
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ment funds are committed by providing registration machinery, which
in turn furnishes a potential investor with the needed information to
make a wise investment decision. 75 Similarly, by providing an investigatory service, the Act attempts to ferret out violators who fail
to register, make untrue statements or deliberately omit material facts.
A. DefinitionalProblems
The availability to the syndicate investor of the Act's protection
hinges preliminarily upon the definition of a security. If the participatory unit in a horse syndication (usually called a share) constitutes
a security within the purview of the Act, the protection and appropriate
remedies of the Act are available to the investor; however, if the unit
does not constitute a security as defined by the Act, the protective
devices, of course, do not apply. The Act defines a security as:
•... any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization cer-

tificate or subscription, transferrable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, frac-

tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security',
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warranty or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.76

While there is some controversy regarding whether this definition,
since it makes no direct reference to syndicates, will reach syndicate
ownership, at least one writer believes that it will, especially in view
of the recent expansions of the security concept. Professor Berger, in
discussing security problems in his article on real estate syndicates,
clearly indicates his belief that syndicate ownership could come within
the purview of the Act's definition of a security:
Because no explicit reference is made either to 'syndicate' or to the
usual forms in which syndicate interests are marketed, some syndicate promoters have been willing to infer that they are beyond

the pale of the act. It is doubtful, however, whether their inference will withstand the combined weight of 77legislative intent,
judicial construction, and current SEC sentiment.

75 A.C. Frost v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941).

76 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).

77Berger, supra note 12, at 761 (footnotes omitted). For discussions which
indicate other unmentioned forms of financial arrangements which might also involve
securities, see Long, Partnership,Limited Partnership,and Joint Venture Interests
as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REv. 581, 587 (1972); Comment, Franchise Sales: Are
They Sales of Securities?, 34 AimnANY L. B-mv. 383 (1970).
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The mere fact that this broad definition makes no mention of syndicate participation nor takes into account the peculiar marketing
technique of horse syndication should not lull one into the instinctive
conclusion that a syndicate share is not a security.
Admittedly, equine and real estate syndications can be distinguished; however, when analyzed from a transactional viewpoint as a
financial investment, the distinctions between the two falter. The
salient consideration financially is that syndicate ownership, be it of
real estate or horse flesh, involves the pooling of resources of a group
of investors to acquire an agreed-upon asset. As a financial transaction
involving a cash flow, to draw distinctions between real estate and
equine investments is to distinguish without logical differences.
That ownership of syndicate shares in horses as well as other forms
of property is a fairly modem and unique concept could explain why
the Act makes no reference to syndicates; however, the modernness of
the ownership form, like the absence of reference to it in the Act, provides no assurance that such an offering is not a security.78 Congressional intent regarding what is a security abundantly indicates that the
Act was intended to include not only the known forms of public
security offerings but also any innovative and unknown forms:
[T]he term security... [is defined] in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition the many types
of instruments that in79our commercial world fall within the ordinary
concept of a security.

In keeping with this spirit, courts and the SEC as well, while unwilling to bring all transactions under the Act, have long indicated a
willingness to read the definition flexibly enough to include many new
forms of enterprise offerings.8 0
B. judicial Treatment
1. Sole Efforts Test
The judiciary has often been in the vanguard in giving generous

content to the definition of a security by the evaluation of novel investment devices. In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,81 the Supreme
78 See Kroll, The Why and How of Real Estate Syndications: Re ulation Aspects, 5 PRAc. LAW., 70 (Mar. 1959). For a discussion of theatrica producers
choosing to register sales of limited partnership interests with the Securities and
Exchange Commission rather than risk liability for securities violations, see Berger,
supra note 12, 761 n.152.
79
80 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d1Cong., st Sess. 11 (1933).
See, e.g., SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264, 267 (E.D. Wash. 1940);
where the court stated that the Securities Act of 1933, a "remedial enactment,
was "to be liberally construed so that its purpose may be realized:"
81830 U.S. 344 (1943).
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Court opened the door to a liberal construction policy in defining
"security":
[T]he reach of the [Securities] Act does not stop with the obvious
and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices... are
also reached if it be proved as a matter of fact that they were
widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which
established their character in commerce as "investment contracts,"
interest or instrument commonly known as a "seor "as 8 any
2
curity."

With the vistas open in Joiner, the Court has retained a continual
and vigilant policy of looking at substance rather than form,8 3 a policy
which leaves room within an expanding security concept for syndicate
ownership. In SEC v. W. J.Howey Co.,8 4 in emphasizing the economic
realities rather than the form of transactions, the Court provided further impetus toward bringing most pure investment arrangements
under the auspices of the Act. While not the penultimate of the Court's
ambition to offer investors protection, it did present new guidelines
for determining what kinds of investment transactions involved securities. Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court in Howey, gave substance to the theretofore nebulous term "investment contract" as a
"security":
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by
formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets
employed in the enterprise.8 s
Noting that the investors involved were predominantly professional
and business men, as investors in horse syndications might be, the
Court stressed that where investors depend primarily upon others for
their profits they need the protection of the Act in spite of their
knowledge, because they possess little actual control over or participation in the enterprise. Knowledge without control over the destiny
of the investment enterprise renders the businessman powerless to
protect his interest. Moreover, the Court took special pains to again
82 Id. at 351.
83 See Tcherepnin

v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967), where the Court said
that "form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality." This remedial approach has been consistently applied by the
Supreme Court. See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180
(1963); SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
84 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
85 Id. at 298-99.
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emphasize that the Act was remedial and easily adaptable to new
investment schemes:
It embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is
capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on
the promise of profits.8 6
The "investment contract" test has had far-reaching and definitive
effects upon the determination of what transactions are to be construed as securities, as state and federal courts have consistently applied its rationale to transactions and writers have subjected its theory
to academic analysis.8 7 Whether or not a share in a horse syndicate
is an investment contract and, consequently, a security, has never been
litigated; nevertheless, it does not take a judicial opinion to point out
that a share in a horse syndicate has many of the characteristics of
such a transaction. Essentially, the Court in Howey enunciated a fourpoint test for determining the existence of an investment contract:
first, the investors must provide money88 and share the risk of loss;
second, there must be an expectation of profits;8 9 third, a common
enterprise must be involved; 0 and finally, the profits must be expected
to come solely from the efforts of others. Clearly, one who invests in a
horse syndication provides capital and participates, in proportion to
his interest, in the profits and losses of the enterprise. Similarly, while
it can be argued that motives other than profit lead one to invest in
a horse syndication, the profit motive, in the sense of breeding rights
or monetary return, is at the heart of horse syndication. Expectation
of profit solely from the efforts of others, therefore, is the key to
whether such an enterprise is a security within the meaning of the Act.
86 Id. at 299.
87 For a collection of "investment contract" decisions, see 1 L. Loss, SEcuranis
RE:ULAIONS
488-89 (2d ed. 1961).
88

Money here means value or money's worth. See, e.g., Roe v. United States,
287 F.2d 435, 439 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 824 (1961); Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188-89 (1961);
State v. Hawaii Mkt. Centers, Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 110 (Hawaii 1971).
89 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n, 199 A.2d 428 (Pa. 1964),
wherein the court determined that the word "profit" should be taken literally.
Therefore a contract providing for the payment of money regardless of the overall
profitability of the enterprise could not be an investment contract. However, since
the "profit" that the definition refers to is the investor's rather than that of the
enterprise, the definition might more properly embrace the expectation of "benefit"
rather than "profit." See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieskd, 361 P.2d 906, 13
Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). The Supreme Court has recognized that market price
appreciation in value-not profits in the commercial sense-is sufficient to satisfy
the profits test for an investment contract. See SEC v. United Benefit Ins. Co., 387
U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
90 See Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream
of Securities Regulation, 24 OrrA. L. Rzv. 135, 162 (1971).
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Hence, control and participation by the shareh6lder in the enterprise
becomes crucial. In this regard it is important to keep in mind that
one of the fundamental characteristics of horse syndicates is the lack of
investor control and the accompanying domination of the enterprise
by the syndicate manager.
Had the Howey definition as originally stated been left unaltered,
one would be relatively comfortable in thinking that a share in a horse
syndicate is not an investment contract, because such an investment
did not rely solely on the efforts of others for its profits; however, such
has not been the case. In Howey, the Court, while providing a
definition for an investment contract, emphasized that the decision as
to whether any transaction was a security ultimately depended on the
"economic realities" of the transactions. Although still somewhat viable,
the "sole efforts" requirement has gradually eroded under increasing
attacks.9 ' As early as 1958, the SEC implied that in spite of the Court's
"sole efforts" language something less might suffice to bring an enterprise's offerings within the ambit of the Act:
The wider the range of services offered and the more the investor
must rely on the promoter or third
party, the clearer it becomes that
92
there is an investment contract.
2. Risk-Capital Test
Simultaneous with the gradual demise of the sole efforts test has
been the developing prominence of the risk-capital criterion for providing form to the heretofore amorphous "economic realities" language.
Fundamentally, the risk-capital test involves discerning whether there
is a "relationship between the success of the enterprise and the
preservation or deterioration of the value which the buyer originally
funished." 3 If the fate of the purchaser's initial investment is inextricably tied to the success of the venture and if the investor is unfamiliar with and/or has little control over the enterprise, the investor's interest is a security. 4 Not stressed as much as the traditional
91 Much of the erosion and dissatisfaction regarding the "sole efforts" requrement can be attributed to Coffey, The Economic Realities of "Security"; Is There a
More Meaningful Formula? 18 WEST. RFs. L. REv. 367 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Coffee].
See State v. Hawaii Mkt. Centers Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971). In that
case, the Hawaii supreme court rejected the "sole efforts" test as being to mechanical and focused instead upon the economic realities of the situation. See also Silver
Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); State v.
Silberberg, 189 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ohio 1956). See Note, Expanding the Definition
of "Security": Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 14 HAST. L.J. 181, 182 (1962).
92 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-3892, 23 Fed. Reg. 840 (1958).
9OCoffey, supra note 91, at 367.
94 Id. at 396-97.
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sole efforts test, the risk of loss notion is enjoying an increasing following both by the judiciary and the commentators.95 As noted in
State ex rel. Commissioner v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,96 the riskcapital approach avoids the pitfalls of perfunctory application of the
sole efforts test and is more in line with the Supreme Court's economic
realities admonition:
The primary weakness of the Howey formula is that it has led
courts to analyse investment projects mechanically, based on a
narrow concept of investor participation .... Thus courts become
entrapped in polemics over the meaning of the word "solely" and
fail to consider the more fundamental question whether the statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors should be applied even to those situations where an investor is not inactive, but
participates to a limited degree in the operation of the business.
...
[We believe a sounder approach to securities regulation requires that courts focus their attention on the economic realities
of securities transactions: that is, "[t]he placing of capital or laying
secure income or profits from
out of money in a way intended to
97
its employment" in an enterprise.
Therefore, under this approach it is the subjection of an investor's
initial investment to the risks of an enterprise over which he exercises
little or no managerial control which is the decisive factor.

C. Investor Control
Under the traditional sole efforts test and the risk-capital approach
the common denominator is the amount of control or participation the
investor enjoys in the enterprise. The key question thus becomes:
Precisely what amount of participation removes one from the spectre
of securities regulation? Any answer, of course, is largely speculative.
In those courts applying only the sole efforts test, it was thought that
participation even of a miniscule degree was enough; 98 however, such
95 See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr.
186 (1961); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Centers, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971); State
v. Silberberg, 139 N.E.2d 342 (Ohio 1956). The SEC has announced its approval
of such a view. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5211, 36 Fed. Reg. 23289
(1971).
96 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971).
97 Id.at 108-09, citing State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938
(Minn. 1920) (footnotes omitted).
9s See Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 213 So. 2d 841 (Ala. 1968);
Georgia Mkt. Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 171 S.E.2d 620 (Ga. 1969); Emery v. SoSort, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio 1964); Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1970); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970). These courts determined that investors participation in the enterprise
in any manner was sufficient to remove the investor's interest from the purview of
the Howey definition and, therefore, from the scope of a "security".
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a view, in light of the purpose of the Act, seems in error 9 and has been
short lived. 00 While the courts have not been altogether lucid in this
area, it appears that functional control or participation, that is, having
powers which actually effect the success or failure of the enterprise, as
opposed to titular or illusory control of the enterprise, is now being
required.' 0 '
Under a functional approach, if the investor is an active participant,
having managerial responsibilities and sufficient control to affect the
success of the enterprise, the arrangement probably will not be a
security. 10 2 Conversely, if the investor is inactive, merely investing
in an enterprise while leaving control and management to other
investors or to a paid professional manager, his investment is a security
and must be registered unless otherwise exempted. 103 Questions regarding what is and is not a security, however, cannot be adequately
answered in a vacuum. Facts and circumstances are determinative;
therefore, a look at the developing case law is necessary in attempting
to discern the dividing line between the active and the inactive investor.
It is clear that where one is participating in an enterprise from the
onset, providing developmental ideas and initial services which make
the enterprise possible, the arrangement is not a security. In Romney
99 See Comment, Securities-Founder Purchase Contracts-"Contract" Defined, 21 MEacza L. REv. 715 (1970), for a discussion of Georgia Mkt. Centers,
Inc. v. Fortson, 171 S.E.2d 620 (Ga. 1969).
100 No cases have been found which have followed the literal application of
the "sole efforts" test which allows any efforts, regardless of how miniscule, to
suffice and take the arrangement from under the definition of a "security" since
1970. The SEC has also denounced the view that minimal participation will take
a transaction outside the scope of a security. See SEC Securities Act Release No.
33-5211, 36 Fed. Reg. 23289-90 (1971), in which the SEC explained:
[T]he assignment of nominal or limited responsibilities to the participant does not negate the existence of an investment contract; where the
duties assigned are so narrowly circumscribed as to involve little real
choice of action or where the duties assigned would in any event have
little direct effect upon receipt by the participant of the benefits
promised by the promoters, a security may be foundto exist.
1The difficulties which a "controlling efforts" test has experienced in supplanting the "sole efforts" test are due in part to judicial reluctance to apply it to
franchise situations. See Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635
(9th Cir. 1969); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D.
Colo. 1970), aft'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
102 See, e.g., Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.
1967); Romney v. Richard Prows, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 313 (D. Utah 1968); People
v. Syde, 235 P.2d 601 (Cal. 1951); Polikoff v. Levy, 204 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. 1965);
Sire Plan Portfolios v. Carpentier, 132 N.E.2d 78 (Ill. 1956).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964); SEC v.
Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962); Curtis v. Johnson, 234
N.E.2d 566 (IlM. Ct. App. 1968); Conroy v. Schultz, 194 A.2d 20 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1963).
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v. Richard Prows, Inc.,10 4 an attorney who had performed professional
services in the acquisition and zoning of certain land and had acted as
a professional consultant in the planning stages of the resulting housing
enterprise, claimed that it involved the sale of an unregistered security.
The court quickly found that it was without jurisdiction to hear the
case, because the project involved a joint venture and not a security
because the profits were "substantially dependant upon the efforts of
the investors." 10 5 Notably here the investor was a sophisticated person
who was a participant in the development of the project from the
onset; his own ideas and efforts were part of the project. However, in
the syndication agreement, the developmental aspect of the project is
completed prior to the syndicate share being marketed. Typically, in
a syndicate arrangement the promoter (who may be the original
owner, the syndicate manager, or both) and the drafter of the syndicate
agreement offer a pre-developed plan in which the investor purchases
shares on a take it or leave it basis. 0 6 At the onset, the syndicate investor provides no service or participation beyond the investment of
his money.'0 7 All arrangements for the purchase, care and control of
the investment property are prearranged by the syndicate promoter;
therefore, the initial participation in an investment enterprise which
provides some investor control is absent in the syndicate arrangement.
Requiring the investor to provide continuing services in the enterprise also comprises a sufficient degree of participation and control to
remove the scheme from the shadow of the Act. For instance, in Lino
v. City Investing Co.,' 0 8 plaintiff had purchased a license which
granted him the right to operate a franchise sales center. The court,
while acknowledging that it required more than minor or ministerial

efforts by the investor to prevent the enterprise from involving a
security, found that the plaintiff had to make significant efforts toward
the success of the enterprise:
He has to open a sales center, staff it, and devote full time and
best efforts to his business. He must recruit area distributors....
The agreements demonstrate that his efforts are not nominal or
msignificant.' 0 9
104

289 F. Supp. 313 (D. Utah 1968).

105
Id. at 314.
0 6
1

Kirkpatrick Interview, supra note 26.

107 Id.
08
-

Nos. 72-1672/72-1673 (3d Cir., Aug. 20, 1973), reported in [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Suc. L. RP. fI 94,124. See also Schuler, Jr. v. Better
Equip. Launder Center, Inc., Civ. Act. 72-3823-F (D. Mass., July 16, 1973), reported in [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SiEc. L. BP. fT94,074; Polikoff v. Levy,
204 N.E.2d
807 (Ill. Ct. App. 1965).
10 9 Nos. 72-1672/72-1673 (3d Cir., Aug. 20, 1973), reported in [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. Szc. L. Ra. II 94,124.

1974]

EQUINE SYNDicATIoN

1063

10
Similarly, in Schuler v. Better Equipment Launder Center, Inc., a
cleaning franchise was deemed not a security because the investor/
franchisee "was to exercise a great deal of control over the day to day
operations of the cleaning establishment."-" While a horse syndication is clearly distinguishable from either of these arrangements, the
conspicuous element the court points to as removing the transaction
from the circumscription of a security is the continual investor participation in the management of and the exertion of control over the actual
investment property. As Professor Coffey has noted, where the buyer
is familiar with the enterprise and "actively participates in its affairs,"
112
the transaction should be excluded from the security category.
Control over the investment property in a racing syndicate is wholly
vested in the syndicate manager. As earlier noted, he makes virtually
all decisions regarding the animal and the enterprise, from training
techniques to the races to be entered. Therefore, exertion of control
over the investment property in a racing syndicate by the investor is
glaringly absent. While not so prominent or complete as the power
vested in the manager of a racing syndicate, control over the investment property of a breeding syndicate, especially if the syndicate
manager retains the power to veto the broodmare selected for breeding
by the syndicate shareholder (or the party to whom he has sold an
available season), rests almost solely in the syndicate manager. The
investor, except during the short breeding seasons, may have little or
no actual contact with the enterprise; the fate of the enterprise
property rests completely with the syndicate manager. Even during
the breeding season the syndicate shareholder may rely to a large
extent upon the expert knowledge of a syndicate manager to determine
whether to exercise his breeding rights or to sell them." 3 Consequently,
where the syndicate manager retains the extensive authority to determine the suitability of a horse for breeding, to reject mares he
deems unfit, and to establish and collect stud fees from seasons sold
or saleable, it is at least questionable whether the periodic sending of
mares for service by the shareholder will satisfy the degree or quality
of control and participation which the courts now demand.
Some clarification of how much control can be vested in a manager
charged with the maintenance and breeding of animals may be found

in Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC," 4 a case in which promoters
110 Civ. Act. 72-3823-F (D. Mass., July 16, 1973), reported in [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fan. L. Rrp. ff94,074.
"l Id. at 94,324.
112 Coffey, su ra note 91, at 398.
113 Kirkpatric Interview, supra note 26.
114 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967).
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sold live breeding beavers to the public while simultaneously encouraging the purchasers to leave the animals at ranches where the beavers
were already located and could be cared for by expert managers.
Investors needed only to purchase the animals, pay the maintenance
fees and reap the profits from the breeding of the beavers which was
to be controlled by the managers, functions not unlike those provided
by the syndicate manager. In finding "the nature of the investor's
participation in the enterprise" to be critical, the court, applying a
risk-capital test, concluded that the success of the enterprise was "inescapably tied to the efforts" of the expert managers, not the investors.
Moreover, the court held that where the investor's role was primarily
"one of providing capital with the hopes of a favorable return then it
begins to take on the appearance of an investment contract" and requires registration. 115 It is conceded that selection of a broodmare
by an investor goes beyond the participation of the investors in Continental Marketing; however, this is tenuous ground on which to base
sufficient investor participation to withdraw the arrangement from the
realm of securities regulation. Furthermore, this basis becomes even
more insubstantial where the syndicate manager retains the power of
rejection, for this renders the power of selection potentially nugatory or
illusory.
Though most of the highly publicized horse syndications have been
breeding syndicates, ostensibly involving persons whose primary purpose in purchasing shares has been to obtain breeding rights for their
own animals, it is quite possible that an investor could purchase a
syndicate share not to use the breeding rights for his own stock but to
sell the breeding rights to interested purchasers each season. In such
a situation the investor does not maintain even the thread of control
associated with the selection process. Moreover the absence of control
in this situation becomes even more vivid if, as is often present in the
syndicate agreement, the syndicate manager is charged with aiding
the investor in locating a buyer for his open season, establishing the
stud fee, and collecting it.116 In such a situation the investor maintains
little more control than an investor in a racing syndicate, where every
aspect of the investment property is controlled by the syndicate manager, and even if doubt persists as to whether other syndicates involve
securities, wisdom dictates registration of this type of syndicate as a
security offering.
115 Id. at 470.
116 Phelps, Sept. 12, at 11. As noted previously, these are often duties which
the syndicate manager assumes.
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Neither mere retention of voting rights nor the reservation of an
actual ownership interest in the investment enterprise is sufficient
control or participation to ensure that the syndicate arrangement is
out of the pale of securities regulations. In Sire Plan Portfolios, Inc. v.
Carpentier,"7 the court found a real estate management arrangement
in which the purchasers retained ownership rights and voting rights
sufficient to term the management scheme a security. The corporation
was to manage the property, pay the expenses and distribute the
profits. Although cognizant that the investors' rights were sufficient
to terminate the management contract, the court found the investors'
control "illusory" and "not real" because the success of the enterprise
depended on the professional management and because the investors
were "without real control of the enterprise."" 8 Similarly, in 1050
Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson,119 a real estate venture in which share
ownership entitled one to proprietary leases subject to a management
contract contrived by the sponsor, the court found the enterprise to
be a security. Notably, the court emphasized the sponsors' pre-sale
control of the destiny of the enterprise, a characteristic not uncommon
in an equine syndicate agreement. In finding the investment arrangement to be a security, the court stressed that where a sponsor has control over the initial financial arrangements, establishes guidelines
which control the destiny of the enterprise, is a part of the management plan, and makes several unalterable decisions for the enterprise
preliminary to the selling of shares, the enterprise constitutes a
security and must be registered.
Likewise, the fact that the syndicate is essentially a hybrid partnership form will not prevent the arrangement from being a security.
Although equal control or right to control is characteristic of the
partnership-type of association, partnership laws have made this right
subject to the terms of the partnership agreement; therefore, as noted
earlier, it can clearly be reduced by contract to a severely limited
power. 2 0 Professor Long has argued wisely that where, as a condition
precedent to one's entry into the partnership, the terms of the contract
render the investor's control illusory, the transaction should be within
the purview of the Act.' 2' This restrictive agreement makes the partner
more like a passive investor than an active investor:
"7

132 N.E.2d 78 (IMI.Ct. App. 1956).

118 Id. at 80-81.

119
365 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
20

1 See KRS § 362.235.
121 Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership and Joint Venture Interests as

Securities, 37 Mo. L. Blv. 581 (1972).
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Where the limited partners have contracted away their voice
in the selection and admission of other limited partners, it is
irrelevant whether the limited partners know the identity of those
to be admitted. In this regard, the limited partnership is like a
corporation. In neither case does the investor have any control
over the acceptance of the other individuals into the organization.
, .. Actually, [the investor] is no longer a partner with the resultant common law partnership duties [and rights]; rather, he is
a passive investor seeking a return22on his capital through the operation of the enterprise by others.
As mentioned previously, the syndicate investor typically agrees to
the control of the investment property being vested in the syndicate
manager as a condition precedent to his being able to purchase the

syndicate share. Whether this reduces the syndicate shareholder's voice
in the control of the enterprise disproportionately to his investment

is clearly a close question of which all parties in the syndicate should
be aware.
While there is no litmus test for resolving the control question,
some additional guidance in this area appeared recently in the language of the court in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,123 a
case involving a pyramiding scheme in which the buyer of a motivation
course "earned" his profit from the enterprise by recruiting other

purchasers. There the court warned:
The most essential consistency in the cases which have considered the meaning of 'investment contract' is the emphasis on
whether or not the investor has substantial power to affect the
success of the enterprise. When his success requires professional
or managerial skill on his part, and he has authority corresponding
with his responsibility, his investment is not a security within the
meaning of the securities acts. When he is relatively uninformed
and unskilled and then turns over his money to others, essentially
depending upon their representations and their honesty 1and
skill
24
in managing it, the transaction is an investment contract.

Paramount in this view is not the position the investor holds in the
enterprise, but rather the functional control the investor exerts in the
enterprise. No longer is the court willing to accept a mere modicum
of participation by the investor. In an opinion affirming the district court
in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,Inc., 125 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the investors, a group with mixed
sophistication, had to exert some effort in the enterprise; however, the
122
123

Id. at 591 (footnote omitted).

124
125

348 F. Supp. at 775.

348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
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court found their activities to be functionally deficient because they
were not "the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."126 Perhaps
warning those involved in financial arrangements in which less than a
share of the functional control of an enterprise is held by an investor,
the court went on to note that:
It would be easy to evade [the sole efforts test] by adding a requirement that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort. Thus
the fact that the investors here were required to exert some efforts
if a return were to be achieved should not automatically preclude a
finding that the Plan or Adventure is an investment contract. To do
so would not serve the purpose of the legislation [Securities Act
of 1933].127

Similarly, in State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,128 a case involving
the inflated purchase of a sewing machine or a cookware set as part of
a founder-member contract with a right thereafter to earn income on
later sales by the enterprise made possible by the revenue raised on
the initial inflated sales, the court found the enterprise to be in violation of the state's security regulations, stating that "[i]n order to
negate the finding of a security the offeree should have practical and
actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise."129
Little doubt exists that the initial requirements for a security (an
investment of money in a common enterprise with an expectation of
profit) inheres in the horse syndicate arrangement. Whether, in light
of the judicial scrutiny being applied to the "economic realities" of
investment schemes, there is sufficient control and participation by the
syndicate shareholder to "affect the success or failure of the enterprise" is a more opaque question. Arguably, there is more than a
126 Id.

at 482.

127 Id.
128 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971).

129 Id. at 111. It should be noted that the definition of an investment contract
offered in this case has been recognized by the SEC as "equally applicable under
the federal securities law" and consistent with the remedial views of the Act as
applied by the Supreme Court. See Securities Act Release No. 33-5211, 36 Fed.
Reg. 23289 (1971). The definition is clearly in line with the risk-capital approach.
An investment contract exists when:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
ani a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise,
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises
or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a
valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual
control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
36 Fed. Reg. at 23291, citing State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105,
109 (Hawaii 1971).
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modicum of participation by a syndicate shareholder because of his
retained breeding and voting rights. Equally, it might be ventured that
where all of the syndicate investors or offerees are sophisticated and
knowledgeable about the investment property, there should be an
inverse correlation to the amount of participation required to exclude
the transaction from the security classification. Thus, if all the offerees
and purchasers are sophisticated (though it is probably a shortsighted
view of the potential and possibly the realities of horse syndications to
presume that only wealthy, sophisticated investors are involved),
perhaps a lesser degree of control should exclude the syndicate from
coverage under the Act due to the abilities of the investors to protect
themselves. Counterbalanced against these arguments remains the
great authority normally vested in the syndicate manager by the terms
of the syndicate agreement and the exigencies of syndicate ownership
which have shareholders residing in different states and countries and
rarely, if ever, contacting the other syndicate members regarding the
destiny of the enterprise. Where so much is at stake, the risks so great
and the balance so precarious, it would behoove one to look carefully
at the terms of the syndicate agreement before sloughing off all
thought of possible securities problems.
VI. EXEMsTON PossIMMrrs
Not every transaction involving the sale of a security falls within
the purview of the Act. Assuming that the sale of a horse syndicate
share under conditions in which the purchaser forfeits his control or
is severely restricted constitutes an investment contract and, therefore,
a "security", it is not automatically necessary that it comply with the
compulsory regulation requirements. In an effort to reduce the workload of the SEC, Congress specifically exempted from registration
certain securities which involved minimal risks to the prospective investor or which could be adequately policed on the state or local
level. 180 Some types of securities are specifically exempted from the
broad provisions of the Act (except for the provisions relating to
fraud), whereas in other situations it is the transaction and not the
security itself which is exempt from registration. For instance, small
offerings are exempt.' s '
130 acobson, Exemptions in Securities Act Registration, 33 FLA. B.J. 69
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Jacobson].
131

15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970) provides:

The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations
add any class of securities to the securities exempted as provided by
this section, if ... enforcement ...is not necessary in the public interest
and for the protection of investors ... ; but no issue of securities shall

(Continued on next page)
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Two frequently utilized exemptions which make registration in any
form unnecessary and which seem potentially more acclimated to
horse syndications than any other exemptions are the intrastate
exemption' 32 and the private offering exemption. 133 While these exemptions are clearly statutorily provided, before one relies too heavily
upon them he should be aware that their usefulness is restricted to
narrow factual circumstances and that reliance upon such an exemption
requires care and foresight in planning. Moreover, the availability of
these exemptions is so curtailed that they may be of no, or extremely
limited, use in the horse syndication situation. Additionally, one who
relies upon a statutory exemption should be aware that the burden of
proof in such a matter is upon the party claiming the exemption and
that the exemption is strictly construed against the claiming party.134

A. IntrastateExemption
The intrastate exemption has been described as "a narrow exemption channel."'u3 Its purpose is to exempt the local financing of local
industries.13 6 While the thoroughbred industry is normally associated
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

be exempted . . . where the aggregate amount at which such issue is

offered to the public exceeds $500,000.
The utility of this provision is limited in that only $500,000 can be raised over
a two-year period.
132 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970). This provision exempts:
Any security which is part of an issue offered and sold only to persons
resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such
security is a person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation,
incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory.
133 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2), (1970) states that the registration requirements of
the Act are inapplicable to 'transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering." See generally Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement,
45 VA. L. REv. 851 (1959); Note, 86 HAIv. L. RPay. 403 (1972); Note, 24 U. FLA.
L. REv. 458 (1972).

134 SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. Sunbeam Cold
Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938).
135 McCauley, Intrastate Securities Transactions Under the Federal Securities
Act, 107 U. PA. L. Ry. 937, 938 (1959) [hereinafter cited as McCauley]. It
may be more narrow than previously anticipated. The SEC has recently
promulgated Rule 147, which will remove many existing uncertainties and also
eliminate possible flexibilities which now exist. SEC Rule No. 147, 39 Fed. Reg.
2353 (1974), requires that the transaction meet four conditions for the rule to be
available: (1) the issuer must be residing and doing business within the state or
territory where all offers and sales are made; (2) the offerees and purchasers must
be residents within such state or territory; (3) reoffers and resale must be limited
to residents of such state or territory for a period of nine months from the date of
the last sale of any p art of the issue; (4) precautions, including legends on
securities, must be taken against interstate distribution. Rule 147 is not the
exclusive method by which persons may claim this exemption. Compliance may
also be satisfied by judicial and administrative interpretations effective on the date
of the issuance. 39 Fed. Reg. at 2356.
136 Delaney Exemptions Under the Securities Act of 1933, 19 BRooK. L. R v.
40, 50-51 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Delaney].

1070

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VCol. 62.

with Kentucky, it would be exceedingly difficult to claim, with any
credibility, that the horse industry is limited to citizens of Kentucky or
that financial interests in it are a state-oriented phenomenon.
When contemplating use of the intrastate exemption, it must be
noted that there may not be a parallel state exemption; 37 therefore,
while federal registration may not be required, it is possible that
compliance with state regulations still may be mandatory. Moreover,
even though an offering qualifies for the intrastate exemption, the
issuer and others, under certain circumstances, may still remain subject
to the Act's civil liability or anti-fraud provisions. 138
To qualify for the intrastate exemption the entire issue must be
offered and sold only to residents of the same state or territory in
which the issuer is a resident and doing business.139 If any term or
condition for the exemption is violated, the exempt status is lost for the
entire issue; 140 therefore, the mere offer to sell to a nonresident is

sufficient to extinguish the benefit of the exemption and to make one
liable for selling unregistered securities in violation of the Act.141 This
liability, of course, runs to the entire issue of the nonexempt securities.' 42

Thus, the Kentucky thoroughbred syndicator who relies

upon the intrastate exemption is restricted to offering and selling shares
only to fellow Kentuckians.
Much of the vagueness and uncertainty surrounding reliance on
the intrastate exemption has been clarified by the SEC's adoption of
Rule 147, which became effective March 1, 1974.143 Rule 147 is intended to provide more objective standards upon which responsible
local businessmen intending to raise capital from local sources may
rely in claiming the intrastate exemption. However, all offers and
sales which are part of the same issue must comply with all of the
conditions of Rule 147 for the exemption to be available. Noncom137 Kentucky has a limited intrastate exemption. See KRS § 292.410(9).

138 See 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970) which states a broad prohibition against the
use of the mails or interstate commerce for the fradulent offering or sale of any
security and 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1970), which provides a civil cause of action
to the purchaser of an exempt security if the security is touched by fraud.
1815 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1) (1970). For a history of this requirement see
H.R. REP'. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933) and SEC Securities Act Release
No. 33-1459,
11 Fed. Reg. 10958 (1937).
140 See Hillsborough Investment Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960);
SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
141 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4434, 26 Fed. Beg. 11896 (1961).
142 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 35-5450, 39 Fed. Beg. 2353 (1974).
See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4877, 32 Fed. Reg. 11705 (1967). For
a discussion of possible civil and criminal liabilities, see McCauley, supra note 135,
at 959. See also Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971) and Studia
Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957).
143
Securities Act Release No. 33-5450, 39 Fed. Reg. 2353 (1974).
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pliance results in liability under Sections 12 and 15 of the Act.'4
The two essential prerequisites of Rule 147 are that "the issuer be
a resident of and doing business within the state or territory in which
all offers and sales are made"145 and that "no part of the issue be offered

or sold to nonresidents within the period of time specified in the
rule."148

With some limited allowances for persons controlling the

issuer, the rule provides "exemption for offers and sales by the issuer
only."147 As shall be discussed, this stipulation can cause serious problems if resale of the shares occur.
The "resident" requirement, for purposes of the intrastate exemption, has been problematical; however, many of the problems which
plague a less specialized type of offering would probably not inhere
in the rather unique horse syndication situation as it presently exists
due to the usually limited clientele and frequent business or social
relationship among them. Nevertheless, Rule 147 requires that "the
issuer of the securities [in horse syndicates, most often the issuer will
be the syndicator, the syndicate manager, or the previous owner]
shall at the time of any offers and the sale be a person resident and
doing business within the state or territory in which all of the offers,
offers to sell, offers for sale and sales are made."

48

Generally the issuer

is deemed a resident of the state or territory: (1) where "it is incorporated or organized" if organized under the laws of a state; (2)
where "its principal office is located" if not organized under state law;
or (3) where "his principal residence is located, if an individual." 49
Not only must the issuer reside within the state, he must also conduct business there. One without the other is insufficient. Prior to the
adoption of Rule 147, however, the doing business requirement was
muddled, with explanations of the requirement ranging from 100%
to bare minimum contacts within his state of residence.150 The SEC
has attempted to remedy this situation by providing some definitive
standards for the requirement in the new rule. Essentially, it requires
one of the following: (1) that the principal office of the issuer be
located in the state or territory where the security is offered; (2)
that the issuer derive 80% of its gross revenues from the state wherein
Id.
Id.
146 Id
144
145

147 Id.

148 Id.
149
50

Id.

2 For a few of the conflicting views on the "doing business" requirement,
see e.g., McCauley, supranote 135, at 950; 1 L. Loss, SEctmrnms RE:uLATON 252
(2a ed. 1961); Berger, supra note 16, at 769.
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the security is offered; (3) that at least 80%- of issuer's assets be located
in the state wherein the security is offered; or (4) that the issuer
iiatends to use and does use 80o of the net proceeds of sales of syndicate shares in connection with the operation of a business or of real
property located in the state wherein the security is offered.15 '
Although far from being lucid, this rule clarifies much of the confusion regarding the "doing business" requirement and clearly rules
out anything less than substantial contacts.
Once assured that the issuer fulfills the "resident" and "doing
business" conditions, one relying upon the intrastate exemption must
next look to the resident requirements of offerees and purchasers.
Rule 147 demands that:
[o]ffers, offers to sell, offers for sale and sales of securities that are
part of an issue shall be made only to persons 5resident
within the
state or territory of which the issuer is resident.' 2
Corporations and partnerships not specifically formed to purchase the
security and other forms of business organizations are deemed a
53
resident of the state in which they have their principal office.'
Individuals are considered residents of the state in which they maintain their principal residence.154 Since a general partner retains his
personal identity to a degree and has property rights with respect to
the partnership property, a partnership formed solely for the purpose
of acquiring an issue or part of an issue is not a resident of a particular
state unless all of the beneficial owners are residents of such state. 55
A syndicate, therefore, if a general partnership, would not qualify for
the intrastate exemption unless all syndicate members were residents
of the issuer's state.
Where the issuer is uncertain of the state of residence of a prospective offeree or purchaser, an investigation should be made before making the sale or offer. Rule 147 recommends the use of affidavits to
provide evidence on the part of the issuer to meet the requirements
of the intrastate exemption, but relying on affidavits or letters of
investment intent clearly does not ensure the application of the
exemption. 5 6 Additionally, the resident requirement cannot be sidestepped by selling or offering an issue to a resident agent of a non'5'

SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5450, 39 Fed. Reg. 2353 (1974).

152 Id.
'53 Id.

154 Id.
55 McCauley, supra note 135, at 948.
156 SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5450, 39 Fed. Reg. 2353 (1974).
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resident buyer or to a buyer who is only a temporary resident15 7
Such devices, while technically in compliance with the rule, are
clearly in violation of the intent of Rule 147 and would destroy the
exempt status of an offering. 158
Another severe limitation -whichwould make reliance on the intrastate exemption hazardous should the horse syndicate arrangement be
declared a security manifests itself in the restriction on resales. Before
the adoption of Rule 147 by the SEC, if during the course of distribution of the securities being sold in reliance on the intrastate exemption,
a person, who qualified as a resident, purchased the security for resale
and sold his security to a nonresident, the exemption would be defeated. 15 9 Moreover, since the exemption was valid only if the entire
issue was distributed under the specified conditions, the resale to the
nonresident contaminated the entire distribution of the issue, and the
issuer was, therefore, subject to sanctions for the entire issue.1 60
Rule 147 has not radically altered the resale restriction; if anything
it makes the requirement even more rigid with the addition of a holding period. Rule 147 dictates that:
during the period in which securities that are part of an issue are
being offered and sold and for a period of nine months from the
date of the last sale by the issuer of any part of the issue, resales
of any part of the issue by any person shall be made only to persons

resident within the same state or territory. 161

For the exemption to be available, the syndicate shares, if securities,
must be placed only in the hands of investors residing within the state
at the time of completion of the ultimate distribution. Additionally,
the shares cannot be sold to a nonresident for nine months from the
date the last share is sold by the issuer. The issuer, should a shareholder sell the share to a nonresident before the holding period has
expired, is susceptible to liability for the entire issue because the
exemption has been destroyed and the entire transaction contaminated.
Merely offering to sell in a resale situation does not destroy the intrastate exemption. Although the resale rule is harsh, it is considered
with the above-noted policy of the SEC to strictly construe the terms
of an exemption against the one seeking to rely on it.162
157 SEC v. Hillsborough Investment Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86 (D.N.H. 1958);
see also THoMAs, SECURiTES ACr HINmBooK 28 (1959).
158 SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5450, 39 Fed. Reg. 2358 (1974).
259 Id.
160 See note 72 supra.
161 SEC Securities Release Act No. 38-5450, 89 Fed. Reg. 2353, 2357.
162

Id.
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Analysis of the restrictions on -the intrastate exemption indicates
that promoter reliance upon it in the horse syndicate situation may be
misplaced. With the stringent residency requirements and the even
more rigid resale limitations, the intrastate exemption is, at best, of
dubious value to an enterprise such as a horse syndication, even one
consisting of few shareholders. If the issuer expects to rely on the
intrastate exemption, both he and his attorney must be aware of several
factors: (1) that registration under the state law may still be mandatory; (2) that in every state, given proper conditions, the anti-fraud
and civil liabilities provisions of the federal law may still be applicable; (3) that violations may subject one to both state and federal
criminal or civil sanctions; and (4) that a resale to a nonresident within
nine months of final distribution can destroy the intrastate exemption,
contaminate the entire transaction, and make one liable for the selling
price of each issue sold.
B. The Private Offering Exemption
A second possible, and perhaps more accommodating, exemption
under which a share in a horse syndication might escape registration
is the private offering exemption.'0 3 The factor which makes this
exemption of dubious value, however, is that the exact dimensions of
a "public offering" are unclear. 6 4 One author has ventured that "where
an entire issue is offered and sold only to a few large investors who
purchase for investment and not with a view to distribution, there are
no registration requirements."'0 5 Under such an interpretation, a
horse syndication could arguably be exempted. 16 Many state laws,
including those of Kentucky, provide quantitative tests in terms of the
numbers of offerees which differentiate between private and public
offerings. 167 Amid speculation and hypothesis, the issuer, relying on
the exemption, should realize that the federal statute does not define
"public offering" nor does it provide a quantitative test; therefore, the
facts and circumstances of each situation are determinative. 68
For many years it was assumed that offerings to twenty-five or
163

15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).

164 Comment, Securities Regulations-Private Offering Exemption: SEC Proposed Rule 146, 48 WASH. L. REv. 922, 934-40 (1973).

165 Delaney, supra note 136, at 55.
166 It should be noted, however, that the Delaney explanation is dated and
that the current trend is moving away from such a broad view. Also, Delaney
contemplated 'large investors" as institutional investrs-not private individuals.
167 See KRS § 292.410(9) which exempts an offer to ten persons or fewer.

168 Jacobson, supra note 130, at 69-70. See also SEC Securities Act Release
No. 33-285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10952 (1935).
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fewer persons would constitute a private offering;'
70

Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.1

69

however, the

made it clear that a

quantitative test was more of a convenience than an entirely dependable rule of thumb. The crucial factor obtains in "the need of
the offerees (whether few or many) for the protection afforded by
registration."' 71 Although quantitative factors are relevant, the private
offering exemption does not depend on numbers, but rather hinges on
the nature of the offering and the personal characteristics of the offerees. As the Court in Ralston Purina stated: "[a]n offering to those
who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not

involving any public offering.'"1 72 Requiring that the judiciary scrutinize whether the offerees are "able to fend for themselves," the Court,
by implication, acknowledged that under proper conditions even a

miniscule number of offerees would need the protection afforded by
federal registration. The SEC has indicated that numbers alone is no
protection to the party claiming the private offering exemption. Rather
it has announced as its policy that:
the number of persons to whom the offering is extended is relevant
only to the question whether their association with and knowledge
of the issues is such that they do not need the protection of the
Act.17
Lower federal courts, in deciding whether the offerees need protection have emphasized the previous business relationship between
the parties and the "sophisticated discernment" with which the parties
entered into the transaction. 74 Recurrent factors which have been
cited as vital in construing the public-private dichotomy have included:
the number of offerees and their relationship to each other and to the
issuer,175 the size of the offering and the manner of the offering, 7 6 and
169 See Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45
L. 1Ev. 869, 872 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Victor & Bedrick].
170 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
'7' Id. at 125.
172
173
174

VA.

Id.

SEC Securities Release No. 83-4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316 (1962).
See, e.g., Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959);
Hirtenstein v. Tenney, 252 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Campbell v. Degenther,
97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
1754 L. Loss SEcuarriEs REGULATION 2644 (Supp. 1969)- Fooshee &
McCabe, Private Placements-Resale of Securities: The Crowell-Cohier Case, 15
Bus. LAw. 72 (1959). For cases discussing this factor, see, e.g., Katz v. Amos
Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); Strahan v. Pedroni, 387 F.2d 720 (5th
Cir. 1967); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959); Hirtenstein v.
Tenney, 252 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880
(D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
176 The size of the offering is probably the least important consideration today. See 2 S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMMS AND RESnCra SECumrriES § 2.2

(1972).
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the expertise of the offerees and their alternative means of success in
obtaining the information which registration would disclose.177 Some
recent cases have shown a tendency among the courts to read the
78
"need" requirement strictly. In Lively v. Hirschfeld,1
in requiring
that the evidence offered by the issuer be explicit and exact and not
built upon mere conclusory statements, the court stated that in order
to qualify as a private offering two factors must be shown: first, the
group must "include only persons of exceptional business experience,"
and second, they must be in a "position where they have regular
access to all the information and records which would show the
potential for the corporation." 17 A factor which should be considered
by the courts in determining whether an investor is "able to fend" for
himself is derived from the risk-capital approach to determining
whether an investment scheme is a security. If an investor, sophisticated and having access to information, is unable to protect the
destiny of his investment due to lack of control, he should be considered unable "to fend for himself." The sophisticated and informed
investor who lacks control in the enterprise is reduced to sterility
regarding his investment. The control necessary to retain the private
offering exemption should be the same as that in defining a transaction
as a security.
Quite clearly, the horse syndicator should not rely upon his relatively small number of offerees to bring him within the scope of the
private offering exemption. There simply is "no magic number" which
guarantees exemption. 18 0 Nevertheless, a comparison of the characteristics of horse syndications with the determinative factors regarding a private offering lends some support to the view that even if an
investment in such an enterprise is a security, it is exempt from federal
registration. For instance, the methods of solicitation thus far used in
horse syndications have manifested many traits common to private
offerings. These include the extensive use of person-to-person solicitation, the absence of an underwriting agreement and a disdain for
the use of mass media advertising. In horse syndications, very often
the promoter conducts no formal solicitation; mere rumors that the
syndicate is being organized may result in its oversubscription.
Similarly, shares in horse syndications are usually sold directly rather
17 Hill York Corp. v. American Intl Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.
1971); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967).
178440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
179 Id. at 633.

180 Jacobson, supra note 130, at 71. See also Sargent, Private Offering Exemption: Current Problemsin Securities Regulations, 21 Bus. LAw. 117-29 (1965).
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than through any established securities distribution channels.' 8 ' This
direct sale technique is commonly thought of as indigenous to private
offerings:
transactions accomplished through direct negotiation between issuer and offeree rather than through established methods8 2of securities distribution, tend to be non-public in their nature.'

The requirement that the investors have access to pertinent records
which would aid them in making an informal investment 83 is
partially, if not fully, satisfied in that the blood lines and other records
regarding equines are available to the public. While this information
does not apprise the investor of the mechanics of the syndicate, it does
provide him with sufficient material by which to determine if he
desires to make an investment and should satisfy the "access to information" requirement. Notably, however, courts have been inconsistent in this area
with the result that what will satisfy this require84
ment is unclear'1
The comparison becomes more strained, however, when one looks
beyond the foregoing characteristics. For example, although many investors in horse syndicates are sophisticated purchasers, the type of
transaction certainly lends itself to being offered to less sophisticated
investors who need the protection and information registration would
afford. Additionally, it should be noted that a mere offer to one unsophisticated investor terminates the availability of the exemption for
the entire issue.' 85 Similarly, the private offering exemption has generally been associated with large, institutional investors rather than
private individuals; 86 therefore, it is conceivable that the private
offering exemption is unavailable to the horse syndicate from the onset.
In any event it seems certain that if diverse or less sophisticated
offerees are involved or if the investors are deemed to be unable to
fend for themselves -because of lack of control over their initial investr
181 Kirkpatrick Interview, supra note 26.

supra note 130, at 71.
183
SEC
Rule
146, 39 Fed. Reg. 15263 (1974).
84
1
In Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th
Cir. 1971), the court indicated that even though only executive officers with
thorough knowledge and high sophistication were involved,- the exemption might
not be available. In Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), the
court urged that only where the investors were shown to have available the same
information that registration affords would reliance on the exemption be warranted.
For the most restrictive view yet, see SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d
137 (5th Cir. 1972), in which the court stated that the burden of proving the
availability of the information is placed upon the party seeking the benefit of the
exemption; if the burden is not carried as to all offerees, the exemption will be lost.
185 SEC Rule 146, 39 Fed. Reg. 15263 (1974).
186 Victor & Bedrick, supra note 169, at 870.
182 Jacobson,
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ment, the arrangement probably would not qualify for the exemption.
Proposals for clarifying the "forty years of confusion" 87 regarding
the private offering exemption must also be taken into account when
considering reliance upon it. These proposals, while not yet law, provide definite indications as to the future of the private offering
exemption and the restrictions which will be placed upon it. 188
The American Law Institute Federal Securities Code x89 would limit
the private offering to "one in which ... (A) the initial buyers are
institutional investors and not more than thirty-five other persons.
.. ,"190 The requirement of the involvement of institutional investors
would all but eliminate the feasibility of the exemption for horse
syndications.
A possible solution to the existing confusion about the private
offering exemption is the SEC's recently adopted Rule 146.l 1' Under
19 2
this rule, the issuer is required generally to meet five conditions
before reliance upon the Rule is justified: (1) the issuer must not
utilize any form of general advertising or solicitation in making the
offer available to prospective purchasers; (2) prior to making any
offer or sale, the issuer has an explicit duty to make a reasonable
inquiry as to the offeree's knowledge and experience in financial affairs; (3) the offeree or his representative must be in a position to
obtain the same kind of information that registration would provide or
they must be furnished with that information; 19 3 (4) there must be no
more than 35 persons who purchase securities in any offering; and (5)
the issuer must take precautionary measures to prevent the transfer
187 Remarks of former Chairman William J. Casey of the Securities and Exchange Commission [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 79,108, at

82,396. For a sampling of the confusion surrounding the private offering exemption, see e.g., Harrison, Thirty-Eight Years Without Definition-The Private Offering Exemption, 24 Aitm. L. REV. 417 (1971); Israels, Some Commercial Overtones
of Private Placement, 45 VCA.L. Rv. 851 (1959); Sargent, Private Offering Exemption, 21 Bus. LAw. 118 (1965); and Note, Reforming the Initial Sale Requirements of the Private Placement Exemption, 86 H~mv. L. REV. 408 (1972).
an excellent discussion of both the ALl proposed securities approach
and
the
SEC
Proposed48Rule
146 approach to the private offering exemption, see
Recent Developments,
WAsH. L. Rzv. 922 (1973).
'89 ALI FEDERAL SECUruTrms CoDE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
'90Id.
191 For the full text of Rule 146, see 39 Fed. Reg. 15266-68 (1974).
192 The conditions set forth represent general requirements for compliance
with Rule 146. The full text of the Rule should be consulted for the requirements
under any particular set of facts. Moreover, the SEC made clear that compliance
with Rule 146 was not the exclusive means by which one can obtain a private offering exemption.
193 The issuer is also required to disclose any "material relationship" between
an offeree representative and himself at the time of the transaction, or to be contemplated, or which existed during two years preceding the present transaction.
For a definition of "material," the SEC looked to Affiated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 39 Fed. Reg. 15263 (1974).
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of the securities by the purchaser unless the purchaser first complies
with the Act's registration requirements. The Rule is not without its
potential for confusion; however, it is abundantly clear that its aim is
to restrict rather than to broaden the availability of the exemption and
to clarify it for easier use by those who fulfill its conditions.
Another risk inherent in relying on the private offering exemption
is the troublesome access-to-information requirement. Whether the
type of information which is accessible to the thoroughbred investor
will satisfy the information requirement is unclear. Additionally, there
is the danger that the courts may look to see if the investor has sufficient control over the enterprise to make his access to information
useful in the sense of protection for his investment. If he lacks that
control, reliance on the private offering exemption may be unjustified.
Finally, perhaps the most dangerous aspect of reliance on the
private offering exemption is the effect of resales on the exempt status.
Securities sold under the private offering exemption are considered
restricted securities, and the resale of such securities is governed by
the operation of Rule 144.194 To ensure that the private offering
exemption is available, the issuer must be sure that he is not selling
his shares to an underwriter, because the effect of such a sale is to make
the exemption unavailable. An underwriter is broadly defined in Section 2(11) of the Act to include
any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or
offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of
any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation
in any such undertaking....19)
The traditional emphasis in this definition has focused on "with a view
to... distribution." Clearly, an individual investor such as a syndicate
shareholder may come within the scope of this definition, which is not
limited to persons who act as professionals. 96
The issuer must therefore take extreme precautionary measures to
assure that a public offering does not result through resales of securities
purchased in transactions otherwise qualifying for the private offering
exemption, for if, in fact, the purchasers do acquire the securities with
a view to distribution, the seller assumes the risk of possible violation
of the registration requirements of the Act and consequent civil and
194

For the full text of Rule 144, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1973). See also
SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5452, 39 Fed. Reg. 6069 (1974), for amendments to Rule 144.
1'56 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
10 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5307 [1972-73 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. Rin. W79,001; SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5452, 39 Fed.
Reg. 6069 (1974). See also SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 444
(N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 477 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1973).
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criminal liabilities. The sale of one share in a horse syndicate, should
it be deemed a security, to a purchaser who "has a view to distribution" (although this is not the only criterion) is enough to contaminate
the entire transaction, force the loss of the exemption, and place the
issuer in jeopardy of selling an unregistered, unexempt security in
g7
violation of the Act.
The key to retaining the exemption for the issuer, then lies in
selling to a person who will not be deemed to be engaged in a distribution; in other words, to a person who is not an underwriter. To
provide the issuer with some additional guidance in this regard Rule
144 sets out five essential conditions which, if met, should remove
the possibility of a sale to an underwriter. 198 Essentially they are: (1)
there must be available adequate public information with respect to
the issuer of the securities (adequacy here is extremely limited and
probably not the type of information the typical issuer of horse syndicate shares could satisfy, as it applies, in general, only to certain
registration and filing requirements under Section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or available public information that would
satisfy the Act if he were required to do such filing); (2) the person
for whose account the securities are sold shall have been the beneficial
owner of the securities for a period of at least two years prior to the
sale; (3) if the sale is by an affiliate (roughly a person who, directly
or indirectly. is controlled by or in control of the .issuer) or nonaffiliate, the sale is limited to one percent of the shares outstanding;
(4) the manner of sale is limited to broker transactions; and (5) the
shareholder must file a Form 144 with the SEC if the sale price exceeds $10,000.191
. Unless these criteria are satisfied, resale of the share by a
shareholder could result in loss of the exemption.200 While at one time it
was thought that affidavits of intent, the legending of the shares or
the issuance of stop-transfer orders would ensure retention of the
exemption for the issue, the SEC has made it clear that these precautions do not provide a "basis for the ekemption" but merely provide a means of preventing illegal distributions. 20' The presence of
107 SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5452, 39 Fed. Beg. 6069 (1974). See
also United States v. Abrams, 357 F.2d.539 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 38.6 U.S. 1001
(1966).
198 SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5452, 39 Fed. Beg. 6069 (1974).
199 This filing requirement may cause the private offering exemption to lose
some of its appeal for the horse syndicate arrangement.
.20o SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5452, 39 Fed. Beg. 6069 (1974).
201 SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5121, 36 Fed. Beg. 1525 (1971).
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the precautions, however, does seem to be 20a2 factor necessary for the
initial offering to qualify for the exemption.
In light of the confusion and limitations regarding the private
offering exemption, reliance upon this exemption by the issuer of horse
syndicate shares is at best hazardous. While many of the characteristics
of the private offering inhere in the syndicate arrangement, sufficient
pitfalls and questions remain to make overzealous reliance on the
exemption both unwise and unwarranted. There are simply too many
indications that the exemption, if available at all, would be available
only on the most restricted and careful basis. Moreover, even if the
issuer overcame the initial hurdle of being exempt from the federal
registration requirements, state requirements may negate the exemption completely or differ substantially from the federal prerequisites
of the private offering exemption.2 03
III. CONCLUSION

Syndicate ownership of animals is not shrouded in legal mystery;
however, the law applicable to such an arrangement is yet in its
evolutionary stage. Although many of the uncertainties are entwined
in the uniqueness of the type of ownership and the flexibility of the
syndicate agreement, the syndicate entity, unless otherwise expressly
designated, should be treated in legal analysis as a partnership (or
joint venture) and the syndicate agreement regarded essentially as a
type of partnership agreement controlled by contract principles.
Even though there is no mystery surrounding syndicate ownership,
such an arrangement should not be approached lightly by the attorney
who advises either the syndicators or a prospective investor. Advantages and disadvantages inhere in syndicate ownership of which
both the syndicator or the potential investor should be made aware.
Not the least of the problems clouding syndications as they now
exist, especially those in which the syndicate agreements shackle any
real investment control or render the control illusory as a condition
precedent to the purchase of syndicate shares, is the possibility that
violations of security regulations pervade the scheme, carrying potential
penalties perhaps not anticipated by either the attorney, the investor,
or the syndicator. Clearly most, if not all, units presently being sold in
202 Id.

203 KRS § 292.410(9) may provide a sizable state level obstacle for the horse
syndicator, should his arrangement be deemed a security, seeking to claim the
private offering exemption. This provision limits private offering to ten persons
unless part of the investors are institutional investors.
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horse syndications are being done so without any attempt by the
offeror to comply with either state or federal securities regulations.
Whether this is caused by the uncertainty as to whether such a transaction is a "security" within the meaning of the Act, the availability,
real or illusory, of statutory exemptions, the aversion by most nonsecurity attorneys to become involved with securities law, or the SEC's
failure to police syndicate ownership is unknown. 20 4 What is known
and should be recognized, however, is that the judiciary and the SEC's
growing propensity to expand the concept of a security20 5 brings the
syndicate share, especially if it contains debilitating control restrictions,
into the gray area of uncertainty regarding the reach of the broadening
securities laws. The troublesome and narrow questions the attorney
proffering counsel regarding syndicates faces, therefore, is whether or
not to register the offering as a security and whether, if.he is dealing
with a security, it qualifies for one of the narrow registration exemptions. When weighing the risks involved in nonregistration and the
chances of fitting the enterprise into the shrinking exemptions, caution,
at a minimum, is advised.
Ronald L. Gaffney
204 Reluctance to register securities involving real estate syndicate shares is
discussed
in Berger, supra note 12, at 760.
20
5 Pasquesi, supra note 69, at 728. For an enlightened discussion of the
practical problems involving an estate with a thoroughbred as an asset, see Henderson, The Thoroughbred Racehorse as an Estate Asset, 113 Tnusr & ESTATE 380
(1974).

